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The Effect of Earned vs. House Money on Price Bubble Formation
in Experimental Asset Markets

Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-Gonzalez, Praveen Kujal, and David Porter ∗

Abstract:
Can “house money” explain asset market bubbles? We test this hypothesis in an asset market
experiment with a certain dividend. We compare experiments where the initial portfolio of
cash and shares is given to subjects, i.e. house money, to a treatment in which individual
initial portfolios are constructed using subject earned money from a real effort task. We find
that bubbles still occur; however trading volumes are significantly abated and the dispersion
of earnings is significantly lower when subjects earn their starting endowments. We further
investigate the role of cognitive ability in accounting for the differences in earnings
distribution across treatments by using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). We find that
high CRT subjects earned more money on average than the initial value of their portfolio
while low CRT subjects earned less. Subjects with low CRT scores were net purchasers
(sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value while the opposite
was true for subjects with high CRT scores.
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1. Introduction
Do individuals make different economic decisions when they use their own money (“earned
money”) compared to when they don’t (“house money”)? Evidence of a “house money
effect” was found by Thaler and Johnson (1990) in a lottery choice experiment. They found
that subjects were more likely to exhibit risk-seeking behavior in the presence of a prior gain.
This result raised the question about the robustness of experimental results where subjects
make decisions using house money.
The effect of house money has been examined in bargaining and income redistribution
experiments. When money is earned, subjects tend to recognize merit and divide money
among subjects according to their respective contributions (Hoffman and Spitzer (1985),
Konow (2000), Oxoby and Spraggon (2008)). In ultimatum games when money is not earned,
merit does not play a role and subjects are more likely to share the initial endowment equally
(Güth et al. (1982), Güth and Tietz, (1988)). 1 But Cherry et al. (2002) show that, in a dictator
game, 95 percent of the dictators follow game-theoretic predictions by not transferring any
amount to the other player when they earned their wealth. Reinstein and Reiner (2001) obtain
similar findings in a charitable giving game. In these studies, subjects earn money prior to
deciding upon the allocation of the outcome by answering a quiz (Cherry, Frykblom and
Shogren (2002), Oxoby and Spraggon (2008)), playing a simple hash mark game (Hoffman
and Spitzer (1985)), adding numbers (Reinstein and Reiner (2011)) or stuffing and folding
envelopes (Konow (2000)). On the other hand Cherry, Kroll and Shogren (2005) find no
evidence of the house money effect in voluntary contribution games. The variability of results
across different games suggests that the effect may also be specific to the environment being
tested.
Even though most of the previously mentioned research provides evidence of a house
money effect in bargaining games, it is not clear that how these results extend to market
games of exchange.
House money vs. earned money in asset markets
It is well known that prices in asset markets do not follow the theoretical prediction and
bubbles are commonly observed with inexperienced subjects (Smith, Suchanek and Williams,
1988). Experimental asset markets are characterized by persistent (average) price deviation
from fundamental value in early periods and subsequent crashes. The question we address is
1

Note that despite extensive evidence of an effect of earned money on the allocation of joint outcomes,
Rutstrom and Williams (2000) report no significant differences in allocations whether endowments were earned
or randomly generated.
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whether the use of house money to endow initial portfolios of cash and shares to subjects
encourages the “mispricing” found in experimental asset markets.
Specifically, we investigate whether traders behave differently when they earn the starting
endowment (“Earned Money treatment”) than when they do not (“House Money baseline”) in
experimental asset markets with price bubbles and crashes. Prices in these markets typically
start below fundamental value (as determined by the expected dividend value of the asset)
and quickly rise above the intrinsic value until a crash occurs in the final periods. Asset
market bubbles have been found to be robust to treatments variations such as short selling,
capacity to buy on margin, brokerage fee, limit price change rules (King et al. (1993), Porter
and Smith (1994)) and assets generating certain dividends (Porter and Smith (1995)). Further,
even though the introduction of futures markets may reduce bubble amplitude, it does not
affect their duration (Porter and Smith (1995)). Nevertheless, a complete set of futures (one
for each of the 15 periods) seems to eliminate bubbles (Noussair and Tucker (2006)).
Interestingly, bubbles tend to disappear with twice-experienced subjects even when
experienced and inexperienced traders are mixed (Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore (2005)).
However, bubbles may still be observed among twice-experienced traders when the market
environment is modified by increasing liquidity and dividend uncertainty (Hussam, Porter
and Smith (2008)). The existence of bubbles has been partly ascribed to subjects’ irrational
behaviors (Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001)). The authors find evidence of systematic errors in
decision making accompanying bubbles. Traders engage in unprofitable transactions at prices
above the maximum possible or below the minimum possible dividend stream.
The asset market environment is a good candidate to study the house money effect as it is
characterized by systematic deviations from game-theoretic predictions. In that context, we
may wonder whether the house money effect can account for part of the discrepancy between
the fundamental value of the asset and the prices observed in the laboratory. Earlier research
on the house money effect offers little guidance to our current study as it mostly examines
bargaining games and aims at studying the role of house money on distributive preferences.
Market experiments differ considerably from these settings as they do not involve concerns
for distributive preferences. The only work that contemplates the potential effect of house
money in a market environment was conducted by Ang, Diavatopoulos and Schwarz (2010).
The authors conducted experimental asset markets (as a robustness check) in which subjects
played with their own money. No significant differences were found between these two
cases. Besides natural concerns with a possible selection bias, the authors’ results should be
interpreted with caution as they conducted only two experimental sessions with subjects’ own
2

money. This small sample follows from the fact that the primary goal of the authors was to
assess the emergence of bubbles under different compensation schemes, wealth and supply
constraints, as well as the effect of the relative risk aversion of traders rather than studying
the house money effect per se.
In order to study the effect of earned money in experimental asset markets, we recruited
subjects for a two-part experiment. In the first part, subjects had to perform a two and a half
hour real effort task that consisted in developing a database for a research institute. All
subjects earned the same amount in this part and were told that their money was carried over
for the experiment which will be realized in the second part. 2 In the second part, which took
place after three days, subjects participated in a standard experimental asset market with
certain dividends (Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), Porter and Smith (1995)). The
value of each subject’s initial portfolio composed of both cash and shares was exactly equal
to the fixed payment earned from the first-day task ($31.5). 3
Our main findings are that bubbles were not completely eliminated in the earned money
treatment and bubble measures were similar in the house and earned money treatments.
Relative to the house money treatment, transaction volumes were 51% lower in the earned
money treatment. One of the direct effects of reduced transactions is that the dispersion of
earnings was more pronounced in the house money compared with earned money treatment.
We investigate earnings dispersion further by categorizing subjects according to their
performance on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) which is one among other possible
measures of cognitive ability performance (Frederick, (2005)). 4 We find that subjects with
lower CRT scores were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below)
fundamental value while the opposite was true for subjects with higher CRT scores. As a
result, high CRT subjects earned more money on average than the initial value of their
portfolio while low CRT subjects earned less. This result was true for both the house and
earned money treatments.
2. Experimental Design and Hypothesis
2.1. Procedure
Ninety subjects from a major university participated in the house money (henceforth HM)
and earned money (henceforth EM) treatments.
2

Further, we made no promises in terms of a safety net that subjects would be able to recover the money from
the experiment (as in Clark (2002)).
3
In addition, subjects were paid a $10 show-up fee for each appearance.
4
This 3-minute questionnaire was administered while subjects waited for their payments to be prepared at the
end of the experiment. As is common in this literature, the CRT was not incentivized.
3

The house money treatment
In the baseline HM treatment, subjects only participated in the asset market experiment for
which they were endowed with a portfolio of cash and shares worth $31.50 from the
experimenter (house money). The HM experiments were conducted as standard asset market
experiments (Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988)). Nine subjects each participated in a
fifteen period asset market. Our only departure from the standard structure was that the
dividend was certain (Porter and Smith (1995)). This was dictated by the design requirement
of the EM treatment where we wanted to ensure that subjects did not see their earned money
being put to risk. A certain dividend guaranteed that if the subjects simply held on to their
shares and cash endowment they would finish the market experiment with the amount of
money they had previously earned.
The earned money treatment
Subjects in the EM treatment were told that they will be participating in an experiment that
has two parts (see Table 1) with the second part taking place three days after the first part.
Subjects were told that they will be performing a task related to a database for a research
institute in the first part and that the amount earned in the task, $31.50, will be carried over to
the second part. 5 They were also informed that they would be paid in cash for the entire
experiment at the end of the second part. Including the two-day show up fees subjects earned,
on average, $51.50. 6
Table 1. Experimental Parameters: Earned Money Treatment
First Day – Task
Second Day – Asset Market
− 2.5 hours
− Continuous double auction
− Download academic articles from
− One asset traded
JSTOR
− 15 periods (4 minutes each)
− Earned $31.50
− Fixed and known dividend of 24 cents
− Money credited to buy asset market
− 9 subjects per market
portfolio in the second part of the
− Initial Endowment ($31.50):
experiment.
o 4 shares & 1710 cents
o 5 shares & 1350 cents
o 6 shares & 990 cents
In the first part of the experiment subjects performed a task requiring (real) effort of two
and a half hours. The task consisted in developing a database of research papers for a
research institute. The task performed by the subjects was intended to resemble as closely as
5

See Appendix B for instructions.
The show up fee was $10 each day. A high show up fee was used in this treatment to ensure that subjects who
participated in the first day experiment would come back for the second. This was indeed the case for all
subjects but one.

6

4

possible a short term job. 7 We ensured that subjects were aware of the economic significance
of their work task by explicitly stating in the instructions that the database to be developed
was going to be used by a research institute (which was indeed the case). In order to stress the
difference between a standard laboratory experiment and the work task (in the EM treatment),
we conducted the two parts, i.e. the work task and the experimental asset market, on two
separate days. 8
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
<14 14-15 16-17 18-19 20-21 22-23 24-25 26-27 28-29 30-31 >31

Figure 1. Histogram of number of downloaded articles.
In our work task, subjects had to search and download academic articles into a file folder
with the objective of building a database. Subjects had to search on JSTOR for the articles,
download them and copy them into a file folder. If they could not copy any article then they
had to state the exact reason as to why it was not downloaded. 9 All subjects were paid the
same fixed wage of $31.50 for the task irrespective of the effort made. This was done to
ensure that the starting endowment for all the subjects was the same in the asset market
experiment. Subjects were told in the instructions (see Appendix B) that they were “expected
to search a minimum of 20 articles in a JSTOR database and download them to a personal
folder with their name (that will be identified later)”. A great majority of subjects (71%) were
able to download 20 articles or more. On average (median) subjects downloaded 21.7 (22.0)
articles, with the maximum number of articles being 31 and the minimum being 14 (see
Figure 1 for a histogram of the number of downloaded articles).

7

This task is similar to that in Falk and Ichino (2006) where recruited students folded papers and stuffed
envelopes to prepare the mailing of a questionnaire study for the University of Zurich.
8
Also, the monitors who were in charge of supervising subjects in the work task were different from the
experimenters conducting the second part of the experiment. This constant supervision also helped to avoid
shirking behavior from subjects.
9
The most common reason for an article not being downloaded was lack of availability due to different
restrictions on download permissions.
5

In the second part, the subjects participated in an asset market experiment (see Table 1).
Each experiment had 9 subjects. Each asset earned a fixed dividend of 24 cents in each period
and lasted for 15 periods. Subjects started the experiment with four, five or six shares and had
cash endowments of 1710, 1350 or 990 cents, respectively. The total value of the endowment
equaled $31.50 dollars for all subjects, which is exactly equal to the money they earned in the
prior task. Subjects were told several times that their earnings will be used in the asset market
experiment. For example, subjects were informed explicitly that:
(i) “Before participating in this experiment, you earned $31.50 by working on the
database for the research institute during 2.5 hours. This full amount of cash will be
used to pay for your initial portfolio in the current experiment.”
We provided each subject with detailed calculations regarding the value of their initial
portfolio which was composed of both cash and shares (see Instructions page 3 in Appendix
C). We then clarified the link between the work task completed in the first part of the
experiment and the initial portfolio endowment.
(ii) “Notice that the value of your initial portfolio corresponds to the earnings in the 2.5
hours you spent working on the database.”
Point (ii) was further repeated in the experimental summary at the end of the instructions
where subjects were told that the initial value of their portfolio ($31.50) corresponded to the
earnings they obtained in the work task three days ago. This was done to ensure that the
subjects knew that they were playing with the amount they earned in the earlier task. We
summarize our experimental design in Table 2.
Table 2. Experimental Design
Number of subjects
Treatment
per sessions
House Money Baseline
9
Earned Money Treatment
9

Number
of sessions
5
5

Cognitive reflection test (CRT)
To complement our analysis of the effect of earned money on individual behavior we
collected data regarding subjects’ cognitive ability at the end of each experimental session.
We used the CRT which is one among other possible measures of cognitive ability
(Frederick, (2005)). The CRT was found to correlate with general measures of intelligence as
well as different aspects of individual decision making such as risk and time preferences

6

(Frederick, (2005), Oechssler et al. (2009)) and levels of reasoning (Brañas, García and
Hernán, (2011)). The CRT consists of the following three questions:
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to
cover half of the lake?
The CRT score corresponds to the total number of correct answers and can vary from 0 to
3.
2.2 Hypothesis
Bubbles in experimental asset markets are characterized in many dimensions such as price
deviations from fundamental value, duration and trade volume. If house money has an effect
it will be manifested in changes in these measures. It seems natural to suppose (and as
suggested by Thaler and Johnson, 1990) that subjects might engage in greater speculative
behavior when they have none of their own money at stake and that this speculative behavior
will likely result in higher trading volumes and mispricing. If, as Lei et al. (2001) and
Kirchler et al. (2012) suggest, bubbles are a manifestation of some underlying confusion
about the market environment, then earned money should have no effect. Given this, we
examine the following null hypothesis in our experiments.
Hypothesis: Earned money will have no effect on the characteristics of price bubbles.
3. Results
We use different measures of bubbles considered in the literature in order to check for
differences between treatments and also to compare with results reported by other authors.
We consider the following measures of bubbles: 10
1. Amplitude: Measures the trough-to-peak change in asset value relative to its
fundamental value. This is measured as, A = Max{(

𝑃𝑡 – 𝑓𝑡
𝐸

𝑃𝑡 – 𝑓𝑡

: t = 1…15} - Min{

𝐸

:t

= 1…15}. Where, Pt is the average market price in period t, ft is the fundamental
value of the asset in period t, and E is the expected dividend value over the life of the
asset.
10

See Dufwenberg et al. (2005) and Corgnet et al. (2010).
7

2. Duration: Measures the length, in periods, in which there is an observed increase in
market prices relative to the fundamental value of the asset. Formally, duration is
defined as:
D = Max{m: Pt – ft < Pt+1 – ft+1 <…< Pt-m – ft-m }.
3. Haessel-R2 (Walter W. Haessel, 1978): measures goodness-of-fit between observed
(mean prices) and fundamental values. It is appropriate, since the fundamental values
are exogenously given. Haessel-R2 tends to 1 as trading prices tend to fundamental
values.
4. Normalized Average Price Deviation (NAV): Sums up the absolute deviation between
the average price and the fundamental value for each of the fifteen periods. It is
defined as follows:
NAV = ∑15
𝑡=1

�𝑃𝑡 – 𝑓𝑡�
15

5. Normalized Absolute Price Deviation (NAP): As defined in Haruvy and Noussair
(2006), NAP measures the per-share aggregate overvaluation (or undervaluation),
relative to the fundamental value of the asset in a given period and is defined as:
NAP = ∑𝐾
𝑘=1
th

�𝑃𝑘 – 𝑓𝑘�
100×45

where, Pk is the price of the k transaction in the experiment, 45 the total number of
shares, 100 is a normalization scalar, and fk is the fundamental value of the asset when
the kth transaction takes place. Large values of NAP reflect volumetric deviations from
fundamentals. This measure is similar to the Normalized Average Price Deviation.
However, NAV does not depend on the number of trades and can then be used to
compare the extent of mispricing in sessions with different levels of trading volumes.
6. Turnover: Measures the volume of share transactions relative to the number of shares
on issue in the market:
Turnover =

∑𝑇
𝑡=1 𝑞𝑡
𝑇𝑆𝑈

Where, T is the number of trading periods, 𝑞𝑡 is the number of transactions in period t

and TSU (Total Stock of Units) is the total number of shares in the market which in
our case is equal to 45.
3.1 Bubble Characteristics

In Figure 2 we plot per period median price for each session in the HM treatment.
Interestingly, although prices always start below the fundamental value, in two of our

8

sessions average prices keep close to the fundamental value for most of the periods. Table 3
reports bubble measures for each session.

Figure 2. Period median prices in the House Money treatment.
We confirm the results of Porter and Smith (1995) by not identifying significant differences
in bubble measures when comparing experimental asset markets with certain dividends
versus markets with asset markets with uncertain dividends. 11 We perform a comparison of
different bubble measures for treatments with randomly drawn dividends and inexperienced
subjects against our HM experiments (see Table A1 in Appendix A). We find that bubble
measures do not differ significantly from those obtained in the HM treatment when
considering standard significance levels.

12

However, we do find a higher level of

heterogeneity in bubble measures in the baseline treatment in two sessions (Sessions 2 and 4).
These sessions were characterized by bubble measures which were two to three times larger
than the average of bubble measures in the EM treatment.

11

We compare our results (with certain dividends) with the results of Corgnet, Kujal and Porter (2010)
(uncertain dividends).
12
We use a multivariate test comparing all bubble measures in our study and in Corgnet, Kujal and Porter
(2010). We report a p-value of 0.33. When comparing each bubble measure separately (see Table A2 in
Appendix A), we report marginally significant differences for amplitude and NAP between our house money
treatment and the baseline treatment in Corgnet, Kujal and Porter (2010).
9

Table 3. Average bubble measures for different treatments
HaesselTreatment Session Amplitude Duration
NAV NAP
R2
1
0.58
9
0.65
59
4.7
2
1.19
13
0.38
130
13.4
House
3
0.53
3
0.82
25
2.1
Money
4
1.05
14
0.48
116
7.7
5
0.85
4
0.35
53
4.7
6
0.46
6
0.82
29
1.5
7
0.60
4
0.80
37
1.3
Earned
8
0.84
5
0.53
69
1.8
Money
9
0.52
8
0.92
81
2.8
10
0.74
4
0.61
27
2.0
House
Average
0.84
9
0.54
77
6.5
Money
Median
0.85
9
0.48
59
4.7
Earned
Average
0.63
5
0.74
49
1.9
Money
Median
0.60
5
0.80
37
1.8
MWW+ (p-values)
0.22
0.53
0.15
0.55
0.03

Turnover
7.4
10.5
4.3
7.9
4.9
3.0
2.9
3.0
2.5
5.8
7.0
7.4
3.4
3.0
0.03

+

Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test.

Figure 3 shows per-period median price for the earned money treatment. Though differing
in magnitudes, bubbles form in three out of five cases in both the HM and EM treatments.
From Figures 2 and 3 one can see significant mispricing in both the house money and the
earned money treatments.

Figure 3. Period median prices in the Earned Money treatment.
Looking at bubble measures (see Table 3) we observe no significant differences between
the house money and the earned money treatment. Amplitude, duration, Haessel-R2 and
normalized average price deviation (NAV) do not differ significantly across treatments. The
only measures showing significant differences are the Normalized Average Price Deviation
10

(NAP) (p-value=0.03) and turnover (p-value=0.03). A lower NAP tells us that relative to the
HM experiments, and considering all transactions, prices in the EM treatment were closer to
the fundamental value. Average (median) trading volumes are 51% (60%) lower in the EM
treatment compared with the HM treatment. Note that NAP is, by definition, closely linked to
trading volumes. By definition, NAP automatically increases with an increase in the number
of transactions K as long as transactions are completed at prices that are not exactly equal to
fundamental values. The fact that the measures of mispricing that are not affected by trading
volumes, such as NAV and Haessel-R2 values, do not differ across treatments suggests that
there are no differences in the pattern of prices across treatments. We conclude that the
difference in the NAP measure across treatments is driven by differences in trading volumes.
Interestingly, if we test for the similarity of all these measures, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that they are equal (p-value = 0.17). 13 We summarize our findings as follows.
Result 1: We find that the earned money treatment has no significant effect on asset
mispricing, but has a significant effect on measures of trading volume.
Finally, we investigate the distribution of subjects’ earnings across treatments. Figure 4
below shows a histogram of subjects’ earnings at the end of the experiment for each
treatment.

Figure 4. Histogram of subjects’ earnings by treatment.
We observe that the dispersion of earnings, measured by their standard deviation and the
Gini coefficient, is significantly greater in the HM treatment than in the EM treatment (Table
4). Note that a crucial element in explaining differences in earnings dispersion across

13

We used command sr.loc.test in R to do these spatial rank tests of multivariate location. We obtained similar
values using a Hotelling’s T2 test (p-value=0.20).
11

treatments is the difference in trading volumes (K) between the earned money and the house
money treatment. 14
Treatment
House
Money

Earned
Money
House
Money
Earned
Money

Table 4. Subjects’ final earnings
Session Standard error
Gini Coefficient
1
28.64
0.45
2
32.61
0.53
3
20.55
0.34
4
17.88
0.30
5
21.68
0.36
6
14.90
0.23
7
11.37
0.19
8
7.04
0.10
9
7.91
0.13
10
15.44
0.24
Average
24.27
0.40
Median
21.68
0.36
Average
11.33
0.18
Median
11.37
0.19

MWW+ (p-values)

0.01

0.01

+

Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test.

Our findings regarding earnings dispersion are summarized as follows.
Result 2: Compared with the house money treatment, earnings dispersion is
significantly lower in the earned money treatment.
In the next section we examine the correlation between CRT scores and individual trader
behavior.
3.2 CRT Correlates
The CRT scores provide one, among other possible, measures of subjects’ cognitive skills
(Frederick (2005)) which can be used to sort subjects accordingly. Table 5 provides subject
score (0, 1, 2, 3) on the CRT and its relationship with subjects’ earnings across treatments.
In Table 5, we compare earnings for subjects with a CRT score of zero with earnings for
subjects with scores greater than zero (last column). 15 With house money, subjects with a
CRT score of zero earn on average $14.28, which is 64% less than the subjects who have
14

The variance of earnings increases in K. Indeed, let us consider a market with two traders, each of them being
endowed with the same amount of cash C. Let us call B the number of times trader 1 is buying the asset while S
is the total number of times trader 1 is selling the asset. The variance of earnings can then be expressed as
follows: 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝐶 + ∑𝐵𝑏=1(𝑓𝑏 − 𝑃𝑏 ) + ∑𝑆𝑠=1(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐹𝑠 )] where 𝑓𝑏 ( 𝑓𝑠 ) is the fundamental value of the asset when
trader 1 buys (sells) the asset for the 𝑏 𝑡ℎ (𝑠 𝑡ℎ ) times. Also, 𝑃𝑏 ( 𝑃𝑠 ) is the price of the asset when trader 1 buys
(sells) the asset for the 𝑏 𝑡ℎ (𝑠 𝑡ℎ ) times. Assuming that prices are independent and identically distributed random
variables with variance σ² then the variance of earnings is: (B+S)σ² =Kσ².
15
The same procedure has been used in Brañas et al. (2011). Our results are stronger if we compare the tails of
the CRT scores distribution (subjects with 0 and 3 scores only).
12

positive CRT scores ($40.11, MWW, p-value=0.0003). This result also holds for the
treatment with earned money (MWW, p-value=0.0092). However, this difference in earnings
across subjects with different CRT scores is significantly lower when subjects use their own
money (EM treatment). In particular, the earnings of subjects with a CRT score of zero were
69% larger in the EM treatment compared with the HM treatment while the earnings of
subjects with a positive CRT score were 15% lower (MWW, p=0.0248 and p=0.1504,
respectively).
Table 5. Baseline Treatment – Mean (Median) Earnings
CRT
House
Money
Earned
Money

0

1

2

3

>0

$ 14.28
($ 11.75)
[15]
$ 24.09
($25.18)
[12]

$ 41.95
($ 2.25)
[10]
$ 34.64
($ 33.53)
[13]

$ 30.97
($ 29.59)
[10]
$ 28.38
($ 30.21)
[7]

$ 47.42
($ 41.16)
[10]
$ 36.88
($ 35.86)
[13]

$ 40.11
($ 40.51)
[30]
$ 34.19
($ 33.43)
[33]

MWW+

(p-values)
0.0003

0.0092

[Number of observations]
+
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. This test reports the comparison of subjects’ earnings with CRT=0 and
subjects with CRT>0.

In Figure 5 we show subjects’ average portfolio value at the end of each period by CRT
score. From the very beginning, subjects with a higher CRT score earn more money and this
difference increases over time. Interestingly, under HM subjects earning differences across
CRT scores are much sharper. Under EM, subjects with a higher CRT score cannot take full
advantage of subjects with low scores. 16

16

For each session and period, we computed the difference in average portfolio value between subjects with
zero CRT scores and subjects with higher CRT scores. We observe that this difference is significantly lower in
sessions with earned money than in sessions with house money from period 4 and onwards (MWW, pvalues<0.1 for every period).
13

Figure 5. Portfolio value at the end of each period.
We summarize our results regarding CRT scores and earnings as follows.
Result 3: Subjects with positive CRT scores earn significantly more than subjects with
a zero CRT score. Differences in earnings across subjects with different CRT scores
are significantly more pronounced in the house money treatment than in the earned
money treatment.
This result is in line with the recent work of Cueva and Rustichini (2012) according to
which subjects with high cognitive skills measured with non-verbal IQ tend to outperform
subjects with low cognitive skills. Now, we analyze some of the possible reasons for the
observed differences in subjects’ earnings. We first study trading volumes and show that
subjects with low CRT scores trade significantly less with earned money than with house
money (see Figure 6). The average number of transactions in each period is higher in the HM
treatment than in the EM treatment.
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Figure 6. Average number of transactions across periods and
treatments by CRT score.
In Table 6 we report the results of a Tobit panel data regression, with random effects by
session, of the number of transactions in each period on subjects’ CRT score. The regression
in the first column shows that subjects with higher CRT scores trade less than subjects with
low CRT scores in the HM treatment. However, this result is not found under earned money
(second column).
Table 6. Number of transactions by period (per subject)
House Money
Earned Money
Constant
10.77***
4.58***
Period
-1.17***
-0.77***
Period2
0.04***
0.03***
d
CRT
-2.76**
-0.12
Period × CRTd
0.29***
0.09
Log-likelihood
-1736.5
-1389.0
Wald Chi2
142.8***
64.65***
Obs (left-censored Obs)
675 (87)
675 (190)
CRTd =0 if subject’s CRT=0 and 1 otherwise.
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01

We summarize our findings as follows.
Result 4: Subjects with a zero CRT score trade significantly more than subjects with
positive CRT scores in treatment HM. In contrast, no significant differences in trading
patterns are observed across subjects with different CRT scores in treatment EM.
We now study trading patterns in more detail and assess whether subjects were net buyers
or net sellers of the asset when the price was lower or higher than the fundamental value of
the asset. We compute the number of net purchases per period for each period as the number
of purchases minus the number of sales of an individual for that period. Table 7 presents the
results of a panel data, with random effects by session, of the net number of purchases on a
dummy variable capturing CRT scores (CRTd) and on the difference between the average
period price and the fundamental value (𝑃�𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 ). We show that subjects with a CRT score

of zero are net buyers (sellers) when the asset price is above (below) the fundamental value
since the coefficient associated with the variable [𝑃�𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 ] is positive and significant. The

opposite is true for subjects with a CRT score greater than zero since the coefficient

associated with the variable [(𝑃�𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 ) + 𝐶𝑅𝑇 𝑑 × (𝑃�𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 )] is negative and significant.

This result is particularly interesting as it shows that higher CRT subjects may be feeding the
bubble in the early stages of the experiment and get out of it before it crashes. Further, the
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effect of CRT score on net purchases is much less pronounced in the house money treatment
than in the earned money treatment. In particular, subjects with a CRT score greater than zero
are not found to be net buyers (sellers) when the asset price is below (above) the fundamental
value in the earned money treatment while this result holds in the house money treatment.
Table 7. Subjects’ number of net purchases by period
Variables
House Money
Earned Money
Constant
0.1169
-0.1527
CRTd
-0.1554
0.2068
�
0.0039***
0.0031*
𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡
-0.0060***
-0.0044**
CRT × (𝑃�𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 )
R2
0.0289
0.0086
2
Wald Chi
19.93***
5.80
(𝑃�𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 ) + CRTd × (𝑃�𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡 )

-0.0021**

-0.0013

d

CRT =0 if subject’s CRT=0 and 1 otherwise.
𝑃�𝑡 is the (session) average price of period t.
FVt is the fundamental value of period t.
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01

Our findings regarding trading patterns across subjects with different CRT scores are
summarized as follows:
Result 5: Subjects with positive CRT scores buy (sell) shares when the asset price is
below (above) the fundamental value. Subjects with a zero CRT score behave in the
opposite manner. These differences in trading patterns across subjects with different
CRT scores are significantly more pronounced in the house money treatment than in
the earned money treatment.
This result means that in our asset market experiments (a zero-sum game), there is a
transfer of earnings from subjects with low CRT scores to subjects with high CRT scores.
Subjects with a high CRT purchase shares in the early periods, when prices are below the
fundamental value and sell those shares when the prices exceed the fundamental value (see
left panel of Figure 7). Interestingly, this transfer of wealth is much less pronounced in the
earned money treatment (see right panel of Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Average number of shares held at the end of the period by CRT score and across
periods for house money (on the left panel) and for earned money (on the right panel).
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the house money effect in an experimental asset market with
bubbles and crashes. We found that even though bubbles still occurred in the earned money
treatment, trading volumes were significantly reduced. The sharp reduction in trading
volumes implied a significant decrease in the dispersion of subjects’ earnings in the earned
money treatment compared with house money.
We investigated earnings dispersion by categorizing subjects according to their cognitive
ability which was measured using the CRT. We found that subjects with lower CRT scores
were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value
while the opposite was true for subjects with higher CRT scores. Consequently, high CRT
subjects earned more money on average than the initial value of their portfolio while low
CRT subjects earned less. This result was true for both the house and earned money
treatments. However, income distribution across CRT scores was more uniform in the earned
money treatment.
Our main conclusion is that there is indeed a house money effect in experimental asset
markets. The house money effect manifests itself in trading volume that subsequently affects
earnings dispersion. Bubbles, however, are maintained and we find no differences between
our two treatments, or comparing our results with other experiments with uncertain
dividends. We take a preliminary step by studying individual behavior in asset markets as
reflected by the well-known cognitive reflection test. We use the CRT to sort subject
behavior in asset markets and find that cognitive abilities, as reflected by the CRT, do seem
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to matter. Individuals with a high CRT score feed the bubble in the early stages and get out of
it in later periods. Further research needs to be done to better understand the link between
cognitive abilities and bubble formation in experimental asset markets.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Comparison with other studies

Table A1. Average bubble measures for related studies*
Amplitude Duration
NAV
House Money
0.84
9
6.5
Corgnet, Kujal and Porter (2010)
1.26
10.33
11.2
Smith, Van Boening and Wellford (2000)
1.39
˗
5.5
Porter and Smith (1995)
1.53
10.15
˗
King et al. (1993)
1.61
9.5
11.8
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988)
1.24
10.2
5.7

NAP
77
130
˗
˗
˗
˗

* All of them are studies with the same number of periods (15) and traders (9)
Data obtained from Corgnet, Kujal and Porter (2010)

Table A2. Average bubble measures comparing HM treatment and Corgnet, Kujal and Porter
(2010)’s baseline sessions with random dividend
Session
1
2
House
3
Money
4
5
N11
Corgnet et al.
N21
N31
House
Average
Money
Median
Average
Corgnet et al.
Median
MWW+ (p-values)
+

Amplitude

Duration

Haessel-R2

NAV

NAP

0.58
1.19
0.53
1.05
0.85
1.08
1.37
1.33
0.84
0.85
1.26
1.33
0.05

9
13
3
14
4
9
12
5
9
9
9
9
1.00

0.65
0.38
0.82
0.48
0.35
0.33
0.10
0.59
0.54
0.48
0.34
0.33
0.18

59
130
25
116
53
119
137
134
77
59
130
134
0.05

4.7
13.4
2.1
7.7
4.7
10.9
9.5
13.2
6.5
4.7
11.2
10.9
0.18

Upward
Trend
3
11
2
9
4
5
9
5
6
4
6
5
0.55

Num
Transactions
334
473
194
355
220
121
132
143
315
334
132
132

˗

Turnover
7.4
10.5
4.3
7.9
4.9
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.4
6.0
6.0
0.65

MWW stands for the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test.

Bubble measures in our HM treatment and those reported by Corgnet al. (2010) are not
significantly different when using a multivariate test (p-value=0.33) 17

17

We used command sr.loc.test in R to do these spatial rank tests of multivariate location. We obtained similar
values using a Hotelling’s T2 test (p-value=0.42).
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Appendix B: Instructions Part I (Task)
Instructions:
• This is a study in decision-making. Funding for this project has been provided by
several funding agencies.
• You will be taking part in an experiment that consists of two parts. In the first part,
you will be required to perform a task related to a Research Institute database.
• The amount earned in the first task is credited to your account and will be used in the
second part. In the second part, you will be participating in an economic experiment.
• The amount you will earn in the first task will be carried over to the experiment you
will take part in the second part. You will be paid IN CASH for the entire
experiment at the end of the second part that will take place at the end of this week.
Today’s Task:
• In this part you will be performing a task for a Research Institute database.
• You have a list of academic articles on your desk.
• You are expected to search a minimum of 20 articles in a JSTOR database and
download them to a folder (that will be identified later).
• You will be credited $31.50 for this task.
Where to save the articles?
• Please, right click on the mouse and create a new folder on the desktop.
• Please, name the folder now using your own complete name.
• You will be saving the articles into this folder.
How to save an article?
• For example, the article:
– Edward L. Glaeser, David I. Laibson, Jose A. Scheinkman, Christine L.
Soutter, 2000, Measuring Trust, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
115, pp. 811-846.
• Go to, http://www.jstor.org/
• Then select Economics.
• Type in the name of the journal, e.g., “Quarterly Journal of Economics”
• Go to the corresponding year and page numbers
• Click on the article and save it to your folder.
How do I download the article from JSTOR?
• Once you find the article you will find a screen similar to the one below
– click on View pdf on the right hand side.
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•

Then click on proceed to pdf.

•

Then right-click on the article to save as in your folder in the format mentioned
earlier.

23

Format of the saved article
Author1&Author2_TitleofPaper_JournalInitialsYear.pdf
• For example, the article:
– Edward L. Glaeser, David I. Laibson, Jose A. Scheinkman, Christine L.
Soutter, 2000, Measuring Trust, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
115, pp. 811-846.
• Will be saved as,
Glaeser&Laibson&Scheinkman&Soutter_Measuring Trust_ QJE2000.pdf
• Note: Journal initials are the first letters of the journal title.
– For example, for Quarterly Journal of Economics the initials are QJE, for
Economic Journal the initials are EJ, for American Economic Review the
initials are AER etc…
What if you do not find the article on JSTOR?
• Move on to the next article on the list.
• Please state on the handout that the article was not available.
What if the journal is not available on JSTOR?
• State on the handout that the journal is not available on JSTOR and move on to the
next article on your list.
• Please make sure that all articles are saved using the naming format we provide
above.
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Appendix C: Instructions Part II (Asset Markets)

INSTRUCTIONS (1/14)
This is an experiment in market decision making. You will be paid in cash
for your participation at the end of the experiment. Different participants
may earn different amounts. What you earn depends on your decisions and
the decisions of others.
[(Only EM treatment) Before participating in this experiment, you
earned $31.50 by working on the ESI database during 2.5 hours. This
full amount of cash will be used to pay for your initial portfolio in the
current experiment.]
The experiment will take place through computer terminals at which you
are seated. If you have any questions during the instruction round, raise
your hand and a monitor will come by to answer your question. If any
difficulties arise after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and
someone will assist you.
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INSTRUCTIONS (2/14)
In this experiment you will be able to buy and sell a commodity, called
Shares, from one another.
At the start of the experiment, every participant will be given some Cash
and Shares.
The shares last for EXACTLY 15 periods of trading. After each trading
period the share will earn a dividend of 24 cents. Thus, if you had a share
at the end of period 1, you would get a return of 24 cents for that period.
If you held a share from period 1 until the end of period 15, then that share
would return to you a total of $3.60 (15 × 24 cents) over the 15 periods.
Similarly, if you bought a share in period 2 and held it from period 2 until
the 15th period, the accumulated dividends would be $3.36 (14 × 24
cents).
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INSTRUCTIONS (3/14)18
You will start the experiment with six shares and 990 cents in cash. The
initial value of your portfolio is identical and equal to $31.50. This is the
case because the total dividend value of each share over the 15 periods is
equal to $3.60 (15 × 24 cents):
990 cents + 6 × $3.60 = $31.50.
[(Only EM treatment) Notice that the value of your initial portfolio
corresponds to the earnings in the 2.5 hours you spent working on the
ESI database.]

18

This part of the instructions was specific to each subject’s initial portfolio. The initial endowment of cash and
number of shares were 990, 1350 or 1710 cents and 6, 5 or 4 shares, respectively.
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INSTRUCTIONS (4/14)
During every period, traders can buy or sell shares from one another by
making offers to buy or to sell.
Every time a trade is made, it will be shown as a dark GREEN dot in the
graph located on the left of the lower part of your screen. Transactions are
also listed on the Market Book located on the right of the graph. If you
buy a share (or somebody sold it to you), the cell in the Market Book will
be shown in light BLUE. The cell will be shown in RED if you sell a
share (or somebody buys it from you). The cells that are shown without
colors correspond to transactions in which you are not involved either as a
buyer or as a seller.

Figure 1: Lower part of your trading screen (graph and market book)
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INSTRUCTIONS (5/14)
To enter a new order to buy or to sell a share, type in the price at which
you would like to buy, or sell, in the appropriate Add order to Buy box or
Add order to Sell box. Click the Add order to Buy or Add order to Sell
button to submit your order.

Figure 2: Upper part of your screen (Buy and Sell)
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INSTRUCTIONS (6/14)
Every time someone posts an order to buy a share, it will be added to the
list of best orders to buy (in the BLUE quadrant). This list shows only the
best FOUR orders. Every time someone makes an offer to sell a share, it
will be added to the list of the best orders to sell (in the RED quadrant).
This list shows only the best FOUR orders.
The orders to buy will be listed from the highest price to the lowest price,
while the orders to sell will be listed from the lowest price to the highest
price.
Your own orders in this list will be highlighted in ORANGE. For
example, you have just posted an order to sell at a price equal to 202 and
this corresponds to the third best order in the market (that is, the third
lowest order to sell). This order will appear in the third place in the list of
orders to sell.

Figure 3: Upper part of your screen (Orders to buy and to sell)
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INSTRUCTIONS (7/14)
To accept an existing order from another participant, click the Buy a share
at or Sell at share at buttons located on the right of the list of orders to
sell and orders to buy, respectively. The list of orders to buy shows you the
four highest orders to buy that are currently available on the market, while
the list of orders to sell shows you the four lowest orders to sell. By
clicking on the Buy a share at button, you buy at the listed price of 104 in
the current example; by clicking on the Sell at share at button, you sell at
the listed price of 96 in the current example. Your own existing orders to
buy or sell are highlighted in ORANGE.
In the situation illustrated in the following screen shot, the best order to
sell corresponds to a price of 104 (the lowest value in the list of orders to
sell). This is the price at which you can currently buy the share. The best
order to buy corresponds to a price of 96 (the highest value in the list of
orders to buy since this is the only order to buy currently available). This is
the price at which you can currently sell the share.

Figure 4: Upper part of your screen (Orders to buy and to sell)
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INSTRUCTIONS (8/14)
Whenever you enter new orders to buy, or sell, you will have those orders
listed in a table below the list of orders to buy and sell. By double clicking
on any cell in the table, you can cancel your own orders.

Figure 5: Upper part of your screen (Orders to buy and to sell)
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INSTRUCTIONS (9/14)
At the end of every period, each share will pay a dividend of 24 cents. The
dividend for each period will appear in the Dividends Table.
The earned dividends (for shares) of each period will be added to the cash
account of the holder.
The number of your shares will change, only when you buy, or sell, shares.
Notice that you cannot place orders to buy for an amount that is greater
than your current Cash. The information regarding the remaining cash
available to buy is displayed in the box below your current Cash. Also,
you cannot place more orders to sell shares than the Number of shares
you currently hold. The information regarding the remaining shares
available to sell is displayed below your current Number of shares.
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INSTRUCTIONS (10/14)
During a period and each time you place an order or complete a
transaction a message will appear in the box above the dividends table.
This message box provides indications on whether your order or
transaction has been completed successfully. For example, if you attempt
to buy a share at a price that is higher than your current cash holdings, a
message will appear in the box stating that you do not have sufficient cash
to buy this share.
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INSTRUCTIONS (11/14)
An example:
Suppose you have 6 shares and 150 in Cash at the start of a period, and
you make one transaction during the period purchasing a share for 110
cents within the period, and the dividend for the period is 24 cents, then:
Your Cash holdings will increase by 34 cents (Dividends of 24 times 6
shares minus a purchase at 110). Your new cash holding will thus be
150+34=184 cents.
Your share holdings will increase from 6 to 7 units.

35

INSTRUCTIONS (12/14)
Another example:
At the end of the previous period, you had 4 shares and 242 in Cash.
Suppose in the next period you make two transactions. You sell one share
for 130 and another share for 110, and the dividend for the period is 24,
then:
Your Cash holdings will increase by 288 cents (Dividends of 24 times 2
shares plus sales of 130 plus 110). Your new cash holding will thus be
242+288=530 cents.
Your share holdings will, however, decrease from 4 to 2 units.
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INSTRUCTIONS (13/14)
This experiment will last for 15 periods. Each period will last for several
minutes. The remaining time (in seconds) will appear on the top of your
screen.
When the time is about to expire, the color will change to RED.
We will have a short practice period to allow you to become familiar with
entering orders and making trades.
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INSTRUCTIONS SUMMARY (14/14)
1. You will be given an initial amount of Cash and Shares.
2. Every share generates a dividend of 24 cents at the end of each of 15
trading periods.
3. You can submit orders to BUY shares and orders to SELL shares.
4. You make trades by buying at the current lowest order to sell or selling
at the current highest order to buy.
5. The market lasts for 15 periods. At the end of period 15, there will be
one last dividend draw. After that the share expires and is worth nothing to
you.
6. The initial value of your portfolio is equal to $31.50 (= 990 cents + 6
shares × $3.60) 19. [(Only EM treatment)This amount corresponds to
the earnings you obtained in the 2.5 hours you spent working on the
ESI database.]

Click "Ready" to start the experiment

19

Again, this paragraph was specific to each subject’s initial portfolio.
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